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developed by rogue 
states
The Problem
• New threats from rogue states
A Solution
• Anti-Ballistic Missile Defenses
A Solution
• Anti-Ballistic Missile Defenses
• Multiple-tier defense
• Air Force, Army, and Navy programs
A Navy Solution
• AEGIS Ships re-fitted to carry and launch a 
variety of anti-missile missiles
A Navy Solution








The Navy AEGIS Problem
• How do outfit and pre-position a limited 
number of AEGIS platforms to meet an 
exigent threat
The Navy AEGIS Problem








The Navy AEGIS Problem
• Intercept during boost phase is best
• Intercept during ascent phase is also 
feasible
• After this, other layers of defense take over

Analysis
• Engagement cycle is very short – a minute 
or two
• Geographic proximity is important
• Each AEGIS will carry just a few 
interceptors
• More than one interceptor variant may be 
carried
Analysis
• A rogue attack will likely be a single salvo
• The salvo will consist of just a few, or 
perhaps just a single ICBM
Analysis
• Source of attack salvo is a small geographic 
area
• Physics limits boost and and ascent phase 
track to threatened targets
Analysis
• Neither attacking ICBM’s, nor defending 
interceptors work perfectly
• The probability of a successful attack is a 
function of the attacking ICBM(s), what is 
attacked in the salvo, and the joint effect of 
interceptors launched
Analysis
• The probability of an attack succeeding 
despite a defense interception is not an 
independent function of each constituent 
event
• A reasonable, conservative assumption is 
that each AEGIS platform will control its 
own engagement
A Notional Decision Model
• The attacker wants to maximize expected 
target damage
• The defender wants to minimize expected 
target damage
A Notional Model
• We seek defense actions (an intercept) that 
minimizes the attacker’s maximum damage
• We assume that the attacker knows what we 
know - where we are, and what we’ll 
intercept with – and that the attacker will 
optimize his salvo with this knowledge
An Attack
• Consists of an ICBM launched at a 
vulnerable target with expected damage
• Multiple ICBM types allowed
• Each ICBM type limited in number
A Defensive Action
• Each ICBM intercept option involves a salvo of 
interceptors varying in number and type
• Each AEGIS platform may be pre-positioned at 
some defendable ocean station
• Each AEGIS platform may be outfitted with a 
variety of missile type loadouts
A Defensive Action
• ICBM intercept probability computed for 
entire salvo as a single event
• At most one option can be launched at each 
ICBM
• Simultaneous engagements by an AEGIS 
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• Where to place each AEGIS defender?
• How to outfit each AEGIS defender?
• Against an ICBM salvo, which AEGIS 
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• We prefer Benders Decomposition
– isolate the ICBM attack subproblem
– from our defensive action master problem
• This permits the defensive action to 
influence any feature in the attacker’s 
problem
Instance
• 8 ICBM’s in a single salvo 
• 5 Aegis platforms
• 20 Candidate Ocean Stations
• 2 Interceptor types
• 25 Interceptors available
Conclusion
• Optimization offers a key tool to investigate 
what to develop, how to outfit, and where to 
deploy
• To defend from any ICBM attack scenario
